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I. INTRODUCTION
In October of 1987, Canadian doctors artificially sustained the life of an
anencephalic infant so that her organs could be transplanted into another child,
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touching off a fiery debate.' At the request of her parents, doctors connected
Baby Gabrielle, who was born missing most of her brain, to a respirator before
flying her to Loma Linda, California, where her heart was transplanted into the
world's youngest recipient of a heart transplant.2 While Baby Gabrielle's par-
ents insisted that their daughter's organs be used in this manner and were pre-
sumably happy with the resulting transplant, one of Baby Gabrielle's doctors
expressed qualms about his role in the saga. Almost immediately, a firestorm
of debate ignited as parents of unborn children with anencephaly began offering
their children's organs for use in similar procedures.3 Critics quickly began
warning of slippery slopes and difficult moral questions.4 This continuing de-
bate calls into question the medical propriety and the usefulness of current med-
ical definitions of death. It also implicates even more fundamental issues,
questioning what is required for a life to be considered fully human and also the
nature and extent of respect, both legal and medical, warranted by such a life.
This Article attempts to demonstrate that organ donation from anence-
phalic infants can be both beneficial and morally justifiable. Section I dis-
cusses the biological and physical manifestations of anencephaly. Section II
introduces the current need for infant organs for transplantation, the possibility
that anencephalic organs could address some of that demand, and the basic eth-
ical positions both for and against the allowance of anencephalic organ trans-
plantation. Section III discusses the dead donor rule, the legal obstacle which
currently makes anencephalic organ donation legally problematic. Section IV
discusses possible legal approaches to permitting organ transplants from anen-
cephalic donors: the abandonment of the dead donor rule would cause too
many undesirable consequences; the classification of anencephalic infants as
non-persons offends society's general ethical norms and creates slippery slope
problems that are in the realm of possibility; however, the classification of
anencephalic infants as persons born into a state of death permits anencephalic
organ donation without denying anencephalic infants personhood status and
opening Pandora's box. Section V lays out legal safeguards necessary to pre-
vent the abuse of an anencephalic organ donation scheme in the event that
mankind perfects its ability to intentionally create anencephalic human organ
donors. Section VI addresses potential class-related social concerns posed by
1. Ellen Goodman, Is This Gift of Life Worth Price, CHIc. TRJB., Dec. 13, 1987, at 2.
2. Sandra Blakeslee, Baby Without Brain Kept Alive to Give Heart, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
1987, at Al (describing the story of Baby Gabrielle and transplant recipient, Paul Holc).
3. See Sandra Blakeslee, Infant Transplant Program Is Halted to Reassess Issues, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 1988, at 17 (noting that, following Baby Gabrielle saga, "more than 200 parents
and physicians representing parents inquired about the possibility of using such babies as organ
donors" but that the program was suspended due to "'medical, ethical, and emotional
difficulties").
4. Peter Steinfels, Ideas & Trends: Infant Organ Plan Ends; Brief Lives, Large
Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1988, at 8 (noting that parents of unborn anencephalic infants
"wanted to donate their newborns' hearts and livers to save the lives of other infants" while
critics "loudly voiced fears that society was marching into a moral quagmire").
[Vol. 6:17
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anencephalic organ donation while arguing that a facially-just transplant policy
should not be tainted by independent social problems, such as lack of medical
care for the poor. This Article concludes by advocating for the sake of infants
in need of organ transplants a properly tailored transplant policy allowing par-
ents of anencephalic infants to donate their children's organs for use in trans-
plants.
II. BIOLOGY
Anencephaly, "generally defined as the congenital absence of skull, scalp
and forebrain," 5 has been described as a "nightmarish neural tube defect.",6 This
condition is "characterized by a lack of brain development above the level of
the brainstem," and such children often lack a cerebrum, cerebellum, and bones
of the skull.7 The cause of anencephaly remains a mystery to modem science,8
although there have been studies demonstrating that supplementation with folic
acid prior to conception and during the early stages of pregnancy can decrease
the chances that a child will be born with anencephaly.9
Children suffering from anencephaly, sometimes defined as an "absence
of the cerebral hemispheres" and occasionally involving malformation or ab-
sence of portions of the brain stem or spine, often possess a jarring appearance,
as "the absent brain is sometimes replaced by malformed cystic neural tissue,
which may be exposed or covered with skin."'10 The effects of anencephaly on
the newborn sufferer are brutal and swift, as there is "no way to save such a
child, which in virtually all cases dies hours after birth."" Anencephaly is easi-
ly diagnosed through amniocentesis and high-resolution ultrasonography, as the
defect typically develops during the first two months of pregnancy. 12 The diag-
nosis frequently results in the abortion of such infants, even in those countries
5. D. Alan Shewmon, Anencephaly: Selected Medical Aspects, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Oct.-Nov. 1988, at 11.
6. Graeme Stemp-Morlock, Pesticides and Anencephaly, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.
A78 (2007).
7. Sue A. Meinke, Anencephalic Infants as Potential Organ Sources: Ethical andLegal
Issues, 12 SCOPE NOTES 1, 2 (1989), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu.
8. See Anencephaly-info, www.anencephalie-info.org (last visited Apr. 11,2008) (follow
link to "Frequent Questions") (noting that no one knows what causes anencephaly, yet stating
that parents do not cause anencephaly).
9. See De Wals et al., Reduction in Neural-Tube Defects After FolicAcidFortification in
Canada, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 135 (2007) (noting that fortification of cereal products with
folic acid in Canada decreased prevalence of neural tube defects, particularly where that
prevalence was previously highest); see also Sandeep Grover & Nitin Gupta, Lithium-
AssociatedAnencephaly, 50 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 185, 185-86 (2005) (describing the anecdotal
case of a pregnant woman with an anencephalic fetus who took lithium prior to conception).
10. THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 2222 (Mark H. Beers & Robert
Berkow eds., Merck Research Laboratories 17th ed. 1999) [hereinafter MERCK MANUAL].
11. Dena Kleiman, For a Catholic Doctor, A Crisis of Conscience, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
1987, at B .
12. See MERCK MANUAL, supra note 10.
2009]
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where the procedures remains illegal.13 If not aborted, an anencephalic infant
has a high probability of being stillborn; however, this fate is not certain.
14
While one medical dictionary states that anencephaly "is incompatible
with life,"' 5 the fact remains that such infants do on occasion survive past birth
to live, in the most basic sense of the word, for a brief period of time.' 6 Inevita-
bly however, anencephaly results in death, as, while a brainstem alone can
maintain the most basic life functions, termed the autonomic functions, for a
short period of time, without the rest of the brain breathing fails sporadically,
with these failures increasing in frequency until respiration ceases altogether. 7
The only remaining question is how swiftly the child's death will come.
Even during their brief lives, anencephalic infants do not experience or in-
teract with the world in a manner that corresponds with any common view of
the human experience. Consciousness, in its most basic sense, is "the state or
condition presupposed by any experience whatsoever.' 8 Anencephalic child-
ren are "by definition permanently unconscious because they lack the cerebral
cortex necessary for conscious thought," rendering them rather similar to those
in a persistent vegetative state. 19 While lower brainstem functions, including
"breathing, blood pressure, temperature, and neuroendocrine control," can con-
tinue for some period of time in the absence of a cerebrum, consciousness and
cognition, "the earmarks of higher brain activity," require a functioning cere-
brum. 20 The lack of consciousness of anencephalic infants has major implica-
13. See Maria Cristina R. Guilam & Marilena C.D.V. Corr~a, Risk, Medicine and Women.
A Case Study on Prenatal Genetic Counseling in Brazil, 7 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS 78,
79 (2007) (noting that in Brazil abortion is a criminal offense, but that in cases of anencephaly
and similar defects, social and even judicial opinion has been mixed).
14. HAROLD CHEN, ATLAS OF GENETIC DIAGNOSIS AND COUNSELING 721 (Humana Press
2006) (referring to anencephaly as the most severe of neural tube defects and noting its common
association with stillbirth and death soon after birth).
15. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 100 (17th ed. 1993).
16. See First, Do No Harm, 122 COMMONWEAL 4 (1995) (observing that anencephalic
babies, when they survive birth, usually die within a few hours or days of their birth); see also
MERCK MANUAL, supra note 10, at 2222 (stating anencephalic infants are not helped by
treatment and are either stillborn or die within days or weeks of birth). But see Tracy K.
Koogler, Benjamin S. Wilfond & Lainie Freedman Ross, LethalLanguage, Lethal Decisions, 33
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 37, 38 (2003) (describing a case involving an anencephalic infant who
survived for approximately two and one half years due to the effects of aggressive care and
mechanical breathing assistance provided when her mother refused to terminate such care).
17. See J.L. Peabody, J.R. Emery & S. Ashwal, Experience with Anencephalic Infants as
Prospective Organ Donors, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 344 (1989) (describing the method of death
typical of anencephalic infants who survive live birth and stating that such death renders their
organs unsuitable for transplantation by time legal requirements for death are satisfied).
18. Bjorn Merker, Consciousness Without a Cerebral Cortex: A Challenge for
Neuroscience and Medicine, 30 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 63, 63-64 (2007) (further defining
consciousness as "the 'medium' of any and all conscious experience").
19. In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 590 (Fla. 1992), as reprinted in JANET L. DOLGIN &
LOIS L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 838, 839 (Aspen 2005).
20. David Randolph Smith, Legal Recognition ofNeocortical Death, 71 CORNELL L. REV.
850, 857 (1986). But see PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: A REPORT ON THE
[Vol. 6:17
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tions for the debate surrounding their use as sources of transplant organs for
other infants.
III. THE POTENTIAL USE OF ANENCEPHALIC INFANTS AS ORGAN DONORS
FOR OTHER CHILDREN
While modem technology has vastly increased mankind's ability to suc-
cessfully transplant organs, the unfortunate fact remains that fewer donors exist
than potential recipients oftransplants.21 This quantitative discrepancy between
those who need organs and the number of organs available for transplantation is
magnified when one focuses specifically on children, as a "severe shortage of
transplantable organs exists for infants and children with life-threatening car-
diac, renal, and hepatic disease., 22 When this shortage of organs for children in
need of transplants is coupled with the fact that many of the organs needed,
such as livers, kidneys, and hearts, "cannot be stored or banked" for later use,23
it becomes apparent that, under the existing system, the demand for organs for
transplantation into children will continue to outpace the available supply.
The medical community possesses the technology necessary to use anen-
cephalic infants as a source of organs for transplantation into other children.24
While anencephalic children lack a brain, the rest of their organs typically de-
velop normally, making them physically suitable for use in transplants. 25 The
way in which an anencephalic infant dies, however, typically destroys the suita-
bility of that infant's organs for transplantation into other infants; as the anen-
cephalic baby's respiratory processes repeatedly lapse due to its lack of higher
brain function, its "oxygen-starved organs are so severely damaged that they are
no longer suitable for transplantation., 26 Medical professionals, however, can
MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHIcAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH 15 (1981) [hereinafter
DEFINING DEATH] (noting that consciousness may not be so easily compartmentalized, that
interactions between cerebral cortex and brainstem may create consciousness, and that "the
'higher brain' may well exist only as a metaphorical concept, not in reality").
21. See Charles C. Dunham IV, "Body Property": Challenging the Ethical Barriers in
Organ Transplantation to Protect IndividualAutonomy, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 39 (noting that
"not every person who needs an organ transplant will receive one"); see also United Network
for Organ Sharing, http://www.unos.org/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (stating that on February 8,
2008, 98,080 patients waited for only 13,224 donor organs).
22. Robert D. Truog, Abstract, Anencephalic Newborns: A Source of Transplantable
Organs?, 5 J. INTENSIVE CARE MED. 82 (1990), available at http://jic.sagepub.com/cgi/
content/abstract/5/2/82..
23. Howard S. Schwartz, Bioethical andLegal Considerations in Increasing the Supply of
Transplantable Organs: From UAGA to "Baby Fae, " 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 397, 398 (1985).
24. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
25. See Jeffrey R. Botkin, Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors, 82 PEDIATRICS 250,
251 (1988) (noting the rate of malformation of anencephalic infant's organs exceeds that of the
general population, "but not to a degree that would preclude their use in transplantation"). But
see Winnie Wai-Ying Li et al., The Eyes of Anencephalic Babies: A Morphological and
Immunohistochemical Evaluation, 117 INT'L J. NEUROSCIENCE 121, 129-32 (2007) (observing
that the eyes of three Chinese anencephalic neonates revealed few retinal abnormalities, but that
the same eyes exhibited degeneration in corneas, irises, and lenses).
26. Jay A. Friedman, Taking the Camel by the Nose: The Anencephalic as a Source for
2009]
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avoid this problem by artificially maintaining the life of an anencephalic new-
born through the use of a respirator and other modem technology so that the
infant's organs can be removed while the anencephalic child is still living, or,
more accurately, breathing thereby preserving the infant's organs for transplan-
tation.27
Such methods have received support from some parents of anencephalic
children.28 In addition, the American Medical Association ("AMA") approved
the harvesting of organs from anencephalic infants in 1995.29 As represented
by the story of Baby Gabrielle,3° such measures could give the parents of anen-
cephalic children the ability to pull some sense of purpose out of the tragedy of
giving birth to a child with anencephaly by granting another child the possibili-
ty of a full life. Supporters of anencephalic organ donation generally argue that
anencephalic organ donation not only provides life to infants in need of organs
at little or no expense to the donor, but also provides a sense of meaning to the
emotionally distraught parents of an anencephalic child; such donation is, there-
fore, under a hedonistic utilitarian calculus, 3 1 "morally justified because it pro-
duces the greatest good for the greatest number of people. 3 2 Not everyone,
however, views harvesting the organs of children with anencephaly in such a
positive light.
The AMA withdrew its report proclaiming that the harvesting of organs
from anencephalic children was intrinsically moral in the face of widespread
criticism in both society and the general medical community.33 Critics typically
Pediatric Organ Transplants, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 924 (1990).
27. Loma Linda University Medical Center, the hospital which performed the transplant
involving Baby Gabrielle, developed the first protocol addressing the use of anencephalic
infants as a source of organs for transplantation. Under that protocol, anencephalic infants were
to be kept on life support for up to a week, at which point, if they were not yet brain dead, the
support would be removed and they would be allowed to die naturally. ANENCEPHALIC ORGAN
DONATION COMMITTEE OF LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, CONSIDERATIONS OF
ANENCEPHALIC INFANTS AS ORGAN DONORS: A WORKJNG DOCUMENT 3-4 (1987) (on file with
authors).
28. Shewmon, supra note 5, at 15 (observing that "[a]lthough there is [sic] no hard data
on the proportion of brain-dead children whose parents are willing to donate their organs, the
experience in UCLA's pediatric intensive care unit approximates 75 percent" and postulating
that when narrowed to anencephalics, this percentage will approach two-thirds).
29. See generally Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, The Use of
Anencephalic Neonates as Organ Donors, 273 JAMA 1614 (1995) (basing new policy on
grounds that anencephalic infants have no interest in life and that the purposes of the "dead
donor rule" were therefore not served by forbidding harvesting of organs from anencephalic
newborns).
30. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
31. Utilitarianism is commonly associated with two British philosophers, Jeremy Bentham
and John Stuart Mill, and "is referred to as a consequentialist or teleological approach to morals
because actions are judged by their results" rather than the principles of the actor. JANET L.
DOLGIN & Lois L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 14-15 (Aspen Publishers 2005). A
utilitarian outlook views an act as justified if it results in a net increase of happiness or pleasure.
Id.
32. Beth Brandon, Anencephalic Infants as Organ Donors.* A Question of Life or Death,
40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 781, 800-01 (1990).
33. DOLGN & SHEPHERD, supra note 31, at 153 (observing that while the issue itself has
[Vol. 6:17
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base their argument against the use of the organs from anencephalic infants for
transplantation on the sanctity-of-life doctrine. This theory tends to disregard
the quality of life issues frequently cited in utilitarian arguments, instead focus-
ing on the belief that all human life is sacred even those burdened with the most
severe handicaps known to medicine and that every life should therefore be
sustained.34 The sanctity-of-life doctrine can often be found entwined with ar-
guments citing Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative, which "calls for hu-
mans to be treated as ends in themselves, and never solely as a means to an
end., 35 Finally, those opposing the use of anencephalic infants as organ donors
argue that to proceed toward such a policy is to risk falling down a slippery
slope of ever worsening consequences.36
The use of anencephalic infant organs for transplantation implicates two
"very influential normative ethical views"' 37 at the heart of most bioethical and
philosophical debates: utilitarianism is often advocated by those in favor of the
use of anencephalic organ donors, whereas Kantianism, expressing a deontolog-
ical viewpoint, is often embraced by those opposing the practice. 38 Given the
chasm that exists between these divergent points of view, the level of consensus
necessary to change the law regarding organ donation by anencephalic infants
seems unlikely to exist in the near future.39 Supporters of anencephalic organ
donation can nevertheless make a strong argument that such donation satisfies
both utilitarian and Kantian normative requirements.
receded in importance due to pre-birth diagnosis and abortion of many anencephalic infants, the
issue remains important due to its influence on debates concerning patients in persistent
vegetative states).
34. See Lois Shepherd, In Respect of People Living in a Permanent Vegetative State-
And Allowing Them to Die, 16 HEALTH MATRIx 631, 677 (2006) (listing the sanctity-of-life
doctrine as among arguments advanced by those who support feeding of patients in persistent
vegetative states in absence of patient's wishes).
35. John D. Arras & Shlomo Shinnar, Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors: A
Critique, 259 J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 2284, 2284 (1989).
36. See Lisa E. Hanger, The Legal, Ethical, and Medical Objections to Procuring Organs
From Anencephalic Infants, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 347, 356 (1995) (noting that "[c]onsidering
anencephalic infants 'dead' or 'close enough to death' instills in the public a fear that other
individuals very near death also will be declared dead and will be killed for the sake of
procuring their organs").
37. ANDERS NORDGREN, RESPONSIBLE GENETICS: THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
GENETICISTS FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN GENETICS RESEARCH 25 (Kluwer Acad.
Publishers 2001).
38. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
39. The practical reality is that whether or not the organs of anencephalic donors are
utilized depends entirely on the laws regarding organ donation. While bioethical and
philosophical arguments will necessarily be used by whatever side eventually wins the debate
over this issue, the arguments in and of themselves will not have a practical effect without a
change in the actual law, and "until there is a consensus that these standards should be changed,
anencephalic infants cannot and should not be used as sources for donor organs." Jennifer S.
Bard, The Diagnosis is Anencephaly and the Parents Ask About Organ Donation: Now What?
A Guide for Hospital Counsel and Ethics Committees, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 49,94 (1999).
See generally David Orentlicher, Commentary, Organ Retrieval from Anencephalic Infants:
Understanding the AMA's Recommendations, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 401 (1995) (reinforcing
the idea that law trumps ethics opinions and pointing out that an ethics opinion regarding
anencephaly expressly declared that its implementation was subject to governing law).
2009]
HeinOnline -- 6 Ind. Health L. Rev. 23 2009
INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW
Making use of the organs of anencephalic infants for transplantation pur-
poses is consistent with a strictly utilitarian calculus because other than the do-
nor, who some argue possesses no or only a slight interest in the matter,40 "all
human parties concerned stand to receive great benefit," including the trans-
plant recipient, the transplant recipient's parents, and the parents of the donor.4'
While some argue that such a utilitarian conclusion fails to take into account
the potentially far reaching consequences of endorsing transplants from anen-
cephalics and thereby risks a rapid descent down a slippery slope, such a risk
can be avoided by framing any justification for harvesting anencephalic organs
in the most narrow way possible to maintain a clear limiting principle on the
logic involved.42 Transplantation from anencephalic infants is, therefore, con-
sonant with a raw utilitarian perspective, as "[u]tilitarianism demands that the
greatest number of persons benefit from the anencephalic infant's organs, even
if it means changing the present legal definition of death to include infants with
anencephaly." 3
The greatest challenge to the use of organs donated by anencephalic in-
fants lies in the form of accusations that such a practice would violate Kantian-
ism, a "bedrock principle of Western ethics," by failing to treat such children as
an end in themselves and denying them their humanity.44 Some answer this
assertion with the claim that "[r]espect for the essential worth of life... is not
an absolute value in the sense of overriding all other values''45 so that a strong
enough balancing of utilitarian factors in favor of allowing anencephalic organ
donation could override Kantian concerns about the practice. Such an ap-
proach, however, unconvincingly attempts to sidestep the Kantian issue by ap-
pealing to a utilitarian formulation. Others argue that Kantian logic does not
apply in the case of anencephalic infants, as Kant "did not have in mind non-
self-aware humans.
4 6
Similarly, some argue that anencephalic infants should qualify medically
40. The absent or low interest in life of an anencephalic infant has also been cited as a
justification for refusing any treatment beyond palliative care to anencephalics. Such an
argument asserts that provision of care to anencephalic infants is both quantitatively and
qualitatively futile. "Quantitatively, it is futile because an anencephalic ... will die soon no
matter what physicians do. Qualitatively, it is futile because they will never be conscious or
enjoy any form of human experience." E. Haavi Morreim, Futilitarianism, Exoticare, and
Coerced Altruism: The ADA Meets Its Limits, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 886 (1995).
41. Ethics and Social Impact Committee, Anencephalic Infants as Sources of
Transplantable Organs, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct.-Nov. 1988, at 29.
42. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
43. Joseph N. Harden, The "Gift" of Life: Should Anencephalic Infants Die to Serve
Noble Goals?, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 1279, 1302 (1996).
44. J.C. Willke & Dave Andrusko, PersonhoodRedux, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct.-Nov.
1988, at 31.
45. Harden, supra note 43, at 1309.
46. J. Steven Justice, Casenote, Personhood and Death-The Proper Treatment of
Anencephalic Organ Donors Under the Law: In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d588 (Fla. 1992)., 62 U.
CiN. L. REv. 1227, 1261 (1994).
[Vol. 6:17
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as being "dead, ' '47 and thus Kantian principles would not bar harvesting organs
from a non-living infant. Making this point could move society closer to the
consensus required to change the current state of the law, thereby opening the
channels through which much needed organs could be acquired from infants
with anencephaly for use in children needing transplants. A proper legal ap-
proach to anencephalic organ transplants must adhere to and reinforce society's
ethical values without upsetting beyond the extent necessary the current legal
approach to organ transplantation.
IV. THE DEAD DONOR RULE: LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON ANENCEPHALIC
ORGAN DONATION
The "dead donor rule" states simply that "it is immoral to kill patients by
taking their organs," 48 meaning that a patient's organs should not be removed
until that patient has been declared legally dead. 49 How doctors apply this rule
in a practical setting has obvious implications for the effectiveness of transplant
procedures. As any transplant surgeon could tell you, "we cannot transplant
organs that have begun to decompose or grow necrotic; thus, we must deter-
mine the death of the human being very quickly when organ donation is de-
sired. ' 50 Thus, the definition of death used by the medical professional making
the determination of death becomes extremely important in a transplant setting.
The common law generally defined death according to "two easily ob-
servable and universally familiar touchstones, namely, a permanent absence of
bloodflow and breathing.",51 This cardiopulmonary definition of death though
traditionally widely accepted as a bright-line rule has come into disfavor as it
"minimizes the possibilities of successful organ transplantation by discouraging
physicians, due to their fear of possible criminal or civil liability, from remov-
ing the donor's organs until after respiration and heartbeat have ceased and the
organs have begun to deteriorate., 52 Under the strict cardiopulmonary standard
of death, an anencephalic child undoubtedly qualifies as alive until complete
respiratory cessation, at which point the child's organs would be useless for
transplantation.53 Such a result would preclude the use of anencephalic infants
47. See infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
48. Elyssa R. Koppelman, The Dead Donor Rule and the Concept ofDeath: Severing the
Ties That Bind Them, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1 (2003) (noting further that the dead donor rule
attempts to balance deontological and utilitarian concerns).
49. See generally Robert M. Arnold & Stuart J. Youngner, The Dead Donor Rule:
Should We Stretch It, Bend It, or Abandon It?, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 263 (1993)
(discussing the dead donor rule, including critiques of the rule and its future).
50. James Dubois, Abstract, Avoiding Common Pitfalls in the Determination ofDeath, 23
ISSUES L. & MED. 204, 204 (2007).
51. Jason L. Goldsmith, Wanted! Dead and/or Alive: Choosing Among the Not-So-
Uniform Statutory Definitions of Death, 61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 871, 879 (2007).
52. Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Tests of Death for Organ Transplant Purposes, 76
A.L.R.3d 913 (1977).
53. See D. Scott Bennett, Comment, Chimera and the Continuum of Humanity: Erasing
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as organ donors; however, cardiopulmonary failure no longer monopolizes the
definition of death, as legislatures have taken measures to keep up with evolv-
ing medical knowledge of the dying process.
Most states have now adopted the Uniform Determination of Death Act
(the "Act"),5 4 which specifies that an "individual who has sustained either (1)
irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead"
and that such a "determination of death must be made in accordance with ac-
cepted medical standards., 55 While this statute allows death, defined in the
United States as the "moment at which the bodies physiological system ceases
to constitute an integrative whole,, 56 to be determined in the traditional com-
mon law cardiopulmonary fashion, the rule also incorporates an alternative me-
thod of determining death in the form of total or whole brain death. In other
words, for the purposes of determining death under the Act, the "ability of other
parts of the body to function via life support is not relevant if the brain has
completely failed. 57
The ability to define death as whole brain death has rendered organ trans-
plantation much more feasible in many cases. If a patient fails a battery of tests
designed to detect brainstem function and it is determined that the patient has
no spontaneous ability to breathe, then the patient is declared dead, and, if an
organ donor, "taken to the operating room for organ recovery and transplanta-
tion, while mechanical ventilation is continued and with the beating heart still
perfusing the patient's organs." 58 In short, at least in most situations, the whole
brain death standard satisfies the dead donor rule while allowing the donor's
organs to be preserved for transplantation.
Unfortunately for children in need of organs, the neurological definition
of death embraced in the Act does not apply easily to newborns in general and
anencephalic infants in particular. To begin, doctors typically have great diffi-
culty determining if brain death has occurred in newborn children since "infants
may later develop brain functions that they do not have at birth," 59 a fact which
has led some thinkers to call upon doctors to wait seven days before making a
the Line of Constitutional Personhood, 55 EMORY L.J. 347, 368 (2006) (observing that the
common law definition of death does not include those with "total, irreparable loss of higher-
level brain function but with some continuing respiratory and cardiac functions").
54. See Jason M. Horst, The Meaning of "Life": The Morning-After Pill, the Question of
When Life Begins, and Judicial Review, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 205,223-24 (2007) (arguing
that states have passed the Uniform Determination of Death Act in an attempt to achieve
universality).
55. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § I (1980), 12AU.L.A. 386, § 1 (WEST 1980 &
Supp. 2003).
56. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 20, at 33.
57. Bennett, supra note 53, at 369.
58. Robert D. Truog, Brain Death-Too Flawed to Endure, Too Engrained to Abandon,
35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 273, 273 (2007).
59. Joseph J. Volpe, Brain Death Determination in the Newborn, 80 PEDIATRICS 293,
294-95 (1987).
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determination of brain death in a newborn.60
To begin, doctors typically have great difficulty determining if brain death
has occurred in newborn children since "infants may later develop brain func-
tions that they do not have at birth,"61 a fact which has led some thinkers to call
upon doctors to wait seven days before making a determination of brain death
in a newborn.62 In addition to the problems inherent in making a neurological
determination of death in a newborn, anencephalic newborns pose special diffi-
culties under such a standard. A child with anencephaly, like a person in a per-
sistent vegetative state, entirely lacks cognitive abilities, and yet nevertheless
maintains spontaneous cardiac and respiratory function, at least sporadically,
during his or her brief life. 63 This maintenance of basic life functions, includ-
ing respiratory functions, is due to the functioning of the brain stem in an anen-
cephalic infant.64 Therefore, anencephalic infants do not meet the requirements
of either prong of the Act; "while their brain stems function, they do not meet
the legal standards for death"65 and therefore will not be able to serve as organ
donors until their organs are too deeply damaged to be of use. Consequently, in
order to enable the use of the organs of anencephalic infants, medicine and the
law must embrace a new approach to the dead donor rule.
V. RETHINKING THE DEAD DONOR RULE: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO A
LEGAL PROBLEM
A. Complete Abandonment of the Dead Donor Rule
Some thinkers advocate that the dead donor rule should be abandoned and
replaced with a regime in which "individuals who desire to donate their organs
and who are either neurologically devastated or imminently dying should be
allowed to donate their organs without first being declared dead. 66 Those who
60. Task Force for the Determination of Brain Death in Children, Guidelines for the
Determination of Brain Death in Children, 37 NEUROLOGY 1077, 77-78 (1987).
61. Joseph J. Volpe, Brain Death Determination in the Newborn, 80 PEDIATRICS 293,
294-95 (1987).
62. Task Force for the Determination of Brain Death in Children, Guidelines for the
Determination of Brain Death in Children, 37 NEUROLOGY 1077, 77-78 (1987).
63. See Multi-Soc'y Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative
State-First of Two Parts, 330 N. ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1501-03 (1994) (listing forms of
permanent unconsciousness, including persistent vegetative state, coma, end stages of
degenerative neurological conditions, and anencephaly).
64. John-Anderson L. Meyer, " 'Tis a Consummation to Be Devoutly Wished- " Towards
Consistency in End-of-Life Treatment Decisions for Comatose Adults and Imperiled Newborns,
10 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 321,335 (2006).
65. Mary Crossley, Infants with Anencephaly, the ADA, and the Child Abuse
Amendments, 11 ISSUEs L. & MED. 379,383 (1996) (noting that anencephalic infant is not dead
until brain stem functions cease, but that natural death damages organs through process of
oxygen deprivation).
66. Robert Truog & Walter M. Robinson, Role of Brain Death and the DeadDonor Rule
in the Ethics of Organ Transplantation, 31:9 CRITICAL CARE MED. 2391,2391 (2003), available
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support the demise of the dead donor rule point to what they view as inherent
flaws in the application of the rule, including the present inability to accurately
assess total brain death and the disconnect between medical and popular defini-
tions of death. 6' Also, opponents of the dead donor rule claim that the rule fails
to inquire into whether the potential donor is being respected as a person, focus-
ing instead on whether the patient in a suspended state is dead or alive. 68 Har-
vesting organs from anencephalic infants obviously would provide no difficulty
under a regime in which the dead donor rule no longer exists; however, aban-
donment of the dead donor rule could have dangerous consequences and is un-
likely to gain any degree of public support.
An outright abandonment of the dead donor rule seems unlikely in light of
the fact that the "' standard view' is that all human beings have the right to life
exactly because they are living human beings and therefore have full moral sta-
tus." Therefore, "[t]aking organs would, on this view, be taking the life of a
human being.' '69 It appears that most people believe that harvesting organs be-
fore death is immoral and would find any attempt to abandon the dead donor
rule undesirable. 70 Abandonment of this rule might even pose purely pragmatic
problems, as it would likely discourage some people from becoming organ do-
nors. 71 The dead donor rule, despite its potentially sweeping breadth, provides
a desirable safeguard in favor of protecting human life. Any efforts made to
gain widespread acceptance for harvesting organs from anencephalic infants
should not try to undermine the dead donor rule entirely. Instead, any proposed
change to the law should engage the rule according to its own terms to show
that the dead donor rule should not be considered violated by the act of harvest-
ing organs from anencephalic infants.
B. Argument That Anencephalic Children Never Possess Life
Some argue that anencephalic children do not qualify as alive, but are in-
stead non-persons, and that the dead donor rule should therefore not apply to
them.72 Those advocating such an approach would modify the dead donor rule
at www.ccmjournal.com/pt/re/ccm/abstract.00003246-200309000-00019.htm.
67. Norman Fost, Reconsidering the Dead Donor Rule: Is It Important that Organ
Donors be Dead?, 14.3 KENNEDY INST. ETHIcs J. 249, 249-51 (2004).
68. Koppelman, supra note 47, at 1.
69. Ari Robin Joffe, The Neurological Determination of Death. What Does It Really
Mean?, 23 ISSUES L. & MED. 119, 138 (2007).
70. See generally M. Potts & D.W. Evans, Does It Matter That Organ Donors Are Not
Dead? Ethical andPolicy Implications, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 406 (2005) (arguing that brain death
is not death and that removal of organs from living, but comatose, patients is immoral, as it kills
patients, and contrary to the nature of medical practice).
71. See Jerry Menikoff, The Importance of Being Dead. Non-Heart-Beating Organ
Donation, 18 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 12 (2002) (postulating that if the dead donor rule were
abandoned, some potential donors might refrain from becoming donors due to fear that doctors
would be overeager to use their organs for transplants while they were still alive).
72. This approach is sometimes rephrased to indicate that anencephalic infants, though
alive, have no interest in life due to their lack of consciousness and that they should therefore be
exempted from the dead donor rule, as their protection does not further its purposes. The two
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to render it "true by definition," retaining the dead donor rule but increasing the
categories of patients considered dead to include those, such as anencephalic
infants, without higher brain function.73 According to this view, "the relevant
brain functions for defining life are higher- level consciousness and cognition,"
so that "[h]umans who lack the capacity for brain function, either because of
congenital defect or subsequent brain death, illustrate that a capacity for brain
function is necessary for legal life and therefore legal personhood., 74 Under
such a view, anencephalic neonates do not possess life, or even potential life,
and do not require life's attendant legal protections, because "[a]ll rights enu-
merated in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights are predicated on conscious-
ness, or the capacity for consciousness, except for the right to life itself, which
becomes meaningless when consciousness can never exist., 75 This view classi-
fies anencephalic infants as not alive, and never having been alive despite their
heartbeat,76 due to their lack of existing consciousness and capacity for future
consciousness. Therefore, doctors may, under such a regime, freely use anen-
cephalic infants as organ sources without fear of violating the dead donor rule.
A regime declaring anencephalic infants to be deceased from conception
poses many difficulties, and seems unlikely to gain any degree of general ac-
ceptance. In several instances, courts have made it clear they do not view anen-
cephalic infants as legally dead from the outset of their existence despite
recognizing that anencephalic children do not possess consciousness. In In re
TA. C.P., the Supreme Court of Florida found "no basis to expand the common
law to equate anencephaly with death," despite explicitly recognizing that
anencephalic infants lack consciousness and, according to general medical opi-
nion, the capacity to suffer. 77 Similarly, in In re Baby K, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals refused to treat an anencephalic child as dead, despite her
statements have the same result, but refusal to deem such infants to be without life seems less
cold and more consistent with the general public's view regarding such infants. See Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, supra note 29, at 1615 (referring to such infants
as alive, but lacking any interest in life due to their lack of consciousness).
73. See Robert M. Veatch, Abandon the Dead Donor Rule or Change the Definition of
Death?, 14.3 KENNEDY INST. ETHIcS J. 261, 262-66 (noting public perception of death differs
from usual assumptions behind dead donor rule, and that sizeable minority of individuals polled
would act inconsistently with dead donor rule altogether under its current definition). See also
Robert M. Veatch, The Dead Donor Rule: True by Definition, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 10, 10-11
(2003) (defending the dead donor rule but arguing in favor of expanding the definition of death).
74. Bennett, supra note 52, at 369-70. See generally Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and
Embryos: A Proposed Frameworkfor Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369 (2007) (noting
that legal or juridical personhood can differ from standard assumptions about personhood and
arguing that legal personhood standards may now be more useful than standard definitions of
personhood).
75. Ronald E. Cranford & David Randolph Smith, Consciousness: The Most Critical
Moral (Constitutional) Standardfor Human Personhood, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 233,247 (1987).
76. Wolfgang Holzgreve et al., Kidney Transplantation from Anencephalic Donors, 316
NEW ENG. J. MED. 960 (1987).
77. In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d at 595 (finding that the lack of consensus on the issue of
whether or not anecephalic infants are alive outweighed the possibility of saving some infants'
lives by allowing organ harvesting from anencephalic infants who do not meet the traditional
definition of death).
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complete lack of consciousness, and instead ordered a hospital overriding the
hospital's belief that life-sustaining treatment was inappropriate to provide
treatment to the anencephalic child at the mother's insistence.78 This reluctance
to view anencephalic children as non-persons does not stem from mere judicial
conservatism; however, as such judicial views draw their force from societal
opinion.
Many feel that "any attempt to include anencephalic infants as permissible
living organ donors is completely inconsistent with societal mores" because
"[t]o redefine infants with anencephaly as being 'born dead' would be tanta-
mount to labeling them as 'non-persons,' 79 a leap many are unwilling to take.8°
This view derives largely from a general societal concern with respect for life,
and is premised on the belief that "[t]o allow removal of the anencephalic in-
fant's vital organs before legal death would allow the active killing of a human
being... [contravening] the current legal prohibition against active killing. 81
Proponents of this view argue that anencephalic infants possess life, and to kill
them is infanticide,82 whether or not their killers intend their deaths to benefit
others.
Society's belief that anencephalic newborns possess life worthy of respect
stems from well-entrenched value systems, including conservative approaches
to major world religions. 83 Observation of anencephalic infants can, in certain
78. When Baby K was born with anencephaly, her doctors put her on a ventilator in order
to confirm their diagnosis. Against the doctors' advice, Baby K's mother refused to accept a
palliative care regimen, instead insisting on life sustaining care whenever her child had trouble
breathing. Baby K wound up in a nursing home, but occasionally had to be admitted to a
hospital to stabilize her breathing. The case arose out of the hospital's eventual attempt to
refuse to provide such treatment. The 4th Circuit held for the mother, granting anencephalic
Baby K the same treatment as any other child would get in the circumstances. In re Baby K, 16
F.3d 590, 597-98 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 825 (1994).
79. Debra H. Berger, The Infant with Anencephaly: Moral andLegal Dilemmas, 5 ISSUES
L. & MED. 67, 83-85 (1989).
80. One argument for the inclusion of anencephalic infants within the category of living
persons says that, despite the defects stemming from anencephaly, such infants "possess a
sufficiently vast amount of human phenotypical traits for one ... to view them as human
children." The argument continues that, as human children, they should be covered by moral
principles prohibiting intentional killing. Alfonso G6mez-Lobo, Inviobility at Any Age, 17
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 311, 319 (2008).
81. Committee on Bioethics, Infants with Anencephaly as Organ Sources: Ethical
Considerations, 89 PEDIATRICS 1116, 1118 (1992).
82. Stephen W. Smith, The Killing of Severely Disabled Newborns: The Spectre Behind
the Legislation of Physician Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 24 MED. & L. 791, 796 (2005)
(listing anencephalic infants among severely disabled infants likely to be victims of infanticide).
83. See Avraham Steinberg, Medical-Halachic Decisions of Rabbi Shlomo Zalman
Auerbach (1910-1995), 3 JEWISH MED. ETHIcs 30, 35 (1997) (describing Jewish rabbi's view
that taking organs from anencephalic infant while spontaneous respiration continues constitutes
murder), available at http://www.medethics.org.il/articles/JME/JMEB2/JMEB2.1 .asp# ftnref
39; Botkin, supra note 25, at 254 (noting the principle of preserving life at all costs is rooted in
Judeo-Christian theology and forbids taking human life, even for benefit of others). See also B.
Larijani & F. Zahidi, Changing Parametersfor Abortion in Iran, 14 INDIAN J. MED. ETMICS 130
(2006) (noting Iran, in its enactment of Islamic law, bans abortion after ensoulment, which
occurs during pregnancy, which would presumably preclude retrieval of organs from
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situations, reinforce this societal view that such infants possess life in a tradi-
tional sense. For instance, despite the lack of higher brain functions, which
would enable an infant to process a good or bad taste (or suffering for that mat-
ter), some anencephalic infants exhibit responses, including recognizable facial
expressions, as a reaction to taste stimuli.8 4 These reactions to stimuli do not
necessarily indicate life in a medical sense, yet such realities cause many people
to revolt at the idea of deeming anencephalics to be anything less than human. 85
Society, therefore, would not likely embrace a view that anencephalic infants
never possess human life due to their lack of consciousness.
Perhaps the strongest reason for refusing to deem anencephalic infants to
be dead in the womb lies in the form of a slippery slope. 86 "The slippery slope
is real" and should not be discounted, as some physicians have in the past pro-
posed transplants from infants with defects that fall short of the severity of
anencephaly.87 These proposals garner any plausibility they might have from
the fact that "[s]ome of the arguments for allowing organs to be taken from
anencephalic infants apply equally to other permanently unconscious patients,
including infants with hydraencephaly and some with microencephaly."88 In-
deed, following the Baby Gabrielle saga, while Loma Linda University was
seeking anencephalic infants as sources of organ transplants, some referrals to
the program were made by doctors of patients who did not have anencephaly,
but rather some lesser malady, including one child who was neurologically in-
tact but lacked functioning kidneys.89 This slippery slope could even extend
beyond the realm of newborns, potentially reaching those who were once con-
scious but have since entered a persistent vegetative state, as anencephaly re-
sembles a persistent vegetative state in that "[b]oth conditions leave affected
individuals entirely devoid of cognitive abilities or awareness but with sponta-
anencepahlic infants already birthed).
84. Michael Berger, A Model of Proverbial Social Development and Its Application to
Social Dysfunctions in Autism, 47:3 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 338,339 (2006). These
facial indications strike many as indicative of at least some level of life, and this view is
supported, albeit in a backhanded way, by the statement that the brain stems of anencephalic
infants "do not differ substantially from the brain stem of a fish, [and such infants therefore]
have more in common with a fish than a person." Sabra Chartrand, LegalDefinition ofDeath is
Questioned in Florida Infant Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, § 1, at 12. As a fish lives, this
quote supports the idea that so too do anencephalic infants.
85. See Tom Nolan,.. And God Will Make Him a Cake, HUMAN LIFE REV., Winter 2007,
at 58 (describing a personal encounter with an anencephalic grandchild with the phrase "He was
a little boy, not an it").
86. But see Sadath A. Sayeed, The Marginally Viable Newborn: Legal Challenges,
Conceptual Inadequacies, andReasonableness, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHics 600, 609 (2006) ("[A]s
most practicing physicians know, perhaps unlike some practicing bioethicists, the real moral
slope is coated with the thickest molasses in these life and death matters.").
87. Brandon, supra note 32, at 802.
88. Committee on Bioethics, supra note 79, at 1118 (noting that the argument that
anencephalic infants are dead due to lack of consciousness and cognitive capacities reaches to
all permanently unconscious patients).
89. D. Alan Shewmon et al., The Use of Anencephalic Infants as Organ Sources, 261
JAMA 1773, 1775 (1989).
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neous cardiac and respiratory functions." 9° Therefore, bioethicists should not
disregard the potentially large consequences of failure to heed the slippery
slope argument.
Without a clear limiting principle, there is cause for concern with any dec-
laration that anencephalic infants never possess life due to their lack of con-
sciousness from birth and their lack of capacity for consciousness at any point
in the future. This slippery slope could even transcend the issue of transplanta-
tion, as the eventual solution to the controversy surrounding the use of anence-
phalic infants as organ sources could have implications for other bioethical and
legal debates that generate intense emotion and fierce argumentation. As R.
Alta Charo argues, the parties in the abortion debate "search for proxy wars,
using debates on research involving human embryos, the donation of organs
from anencephalic neonates, and the right of persons in a persistent vegetative
state to die as opportunities to rehearse arguments on the value of biologic but
nonsentient human existence." 91 Given the possible implications of a wide
sweeping announcement that anencephalic infants meet the criteria of being
dead prior to birth, a more limited method ofjustifying the use of anencephalic
infants as organ sources seems morally, and less importantly, practically, neces-
sary in light of the dead donor rule.
C. A Limited Approach Qualifying Anencephalic Infants as an Exception to
The Dead Donor Rule
A more tenable approach towards classifying anencephalic infants in light
of the dead donor rule would be to consider them "brain-absent" to a degree
sufficient to justify their treatment as brain dead.92 This approach, in essence,
argues that "because anencephalic infants lack integrated brain function and
will inevitably die within a short period of time, they are conceptually very
close to being brain dead individuals-close enough to be considered brain
dead., 93 Such an approach would result in the creation of an entirely new cate-
gory of brain death filled by anencephalic infants, so that any infant diagnosed
as anencephalic, and only those infants diagnosed as anencephalic, would
qualify as legally dead under the new category. 94 Doctors would have little dif-
ficulty implementing such a standard since diagnoses of anencephaly are "al-
most never ambiguous, "'9 due to the unique physical manifestations of
90. Barbara Noah, Comment, Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo
Controversy, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 109 (2004).
91. R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience-Refusing to Deliver Medical Care.
352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2471, 2472 (2005).
92. M.R. Harrison, The Anencephalic N",born as Organ Donor, H sTINGS CENTER REP.,
Apr. 1986, at 21-23.
93. Committee on Bioethics, supra note 79, at 1118.
94. See Norman Fost, Removing Organs from Anencephalic Infants: Ethical and Legal
Considerations, 16 CLINICS IN PERINATOLOGY 331, 334 (1989).
95. Kathleen L. Paliokas, Anencephalic Newborns as Organ Donors: An Assessment of
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anencephaly.
This view acknowledges that anencephalic infants possess life, and there-
fore does not try to classify them as non-persons. Instead, it recognizes that
"[a]ll anencephalics begin to die as soon as they are born." 96 While the differ-
ence between this theory and the theory that anencephalic infants never possess
life might seem like mere semantics, there are differences in the resulting impli-
cations of the two views. The view that anencephalic infants do possess life,
but immediately begin to die at birth, avoids slippery slope pitfalls inherent in
the theory classifying the permanently unconscious as dead while remaining
more in line with widespread views about personhood than pronouncements
that anencephalic infants do not ever possess life. Regardless of whether one
views the onset of death as a process,97 or an event,98 the relevant inquiry for
making a determination of death should focus on death as a state, as such a
view allows determinations of death to occur in a functional manner that not
only is consistent with most religious and philosophical characterizations of
death, but that also meets the needs of law and medicine for a definition of
death. 99 Instead of arguing that anencephalic infants never live or lack an inter-
est in life due to their lack of consciousness this view asserts that anencephalic
children, though born alive, immediately begin to die, as evidenced by their
complete lack of cognitive potentiality and imminent physical death, typically
occurring within three days of birth.100 Thus, they enter a state of death as soon
as they enter the world. 10 1 This view does not attempt to deny the personhood
of anencephalic infants, which would be hard to justify in light of the heartfelt
views of many that such infants are persons. Yet at the same time, this view
satisfies the requirements of the dead donor rule, 10 2 thereby ensuring that the
valuable organs of these small donors do not remain permanently off-limits.'0 3
"Death" and Legislative Policy, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197,200 (1989).
96. Id.
97. See Baruch A. Brody, How Much of the Brain Must Be Dead?, in THE DEFINITION OF
DEATH: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES 71 (Stuart J. Younger et. al. eds., 1999) (defending the
view that death occurs as a process).
98. See J.L. Bernat, C.M. Culver & B. Gert, On the Definition and Criterion ofDeath, 94
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 389 (1981) (expressing the view that death occurs as an event).
99. James M. DuBois, Is Organ Procurement Causing the Death of Patients?, 18 ISSUES
L. & MED. 21,23 (2002).
100. See Alasdair G.W. Hunter, Brain and Spinal Cord, in HUMAN MALFORMATIONS AND
RELATED ANOMALIES 715, 737 (Roger E. Stevenson & Judith G. Hall eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2005) (noting that fifty-eight percent of anencephalic children born alive suffer physical death
within three days of birth).
101. Committee on Bioethics, supra note 79, at 1118.
102. See Dubois, supra note 50, at 204 ("The key question that should be asked before
organ procurement is, 'Is this body in a state of death?' If the body is in such a state, then the
question of killing via organ procurement is moot, because killing involves causing someone to
enter the state of death.").
103. I merely argue here that such a position appears more likely than available alternative
approaches to both define anencephalic infants as dead and accord them the personhood status
to which most of society feels they are entitled. Undoubtedly, there will be critics who will
argue in favor of maintaining the brightline definition of death embodied in current law and will
likely state that a "dying person is still alive" and that a "prediction that death will occur soon is
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An approach centered on the brain absence and imminent physical death
of anencephalic infants avoids the slippery slope concerns inherent in a broad-
sweeping declaration that anencephalic infants, due to their lack of potential for
consciousness, never qualify as alive in the first instance. If the medical profes-
sion or law begins to treat anencephalic infants as inherently devoid of life, the
fear is that "doctors, legislators, or the courts could use the same rationale to
declare others dead for the same purposes, including persons in a persistent ve-
getative state and possibly infants with other severe birth defects."' 0 4 Under a
more limited approach focused on the specifics of anencephaly, this fear is not
present. As the permanently unconscious, whether through defect or through
injury, do not face imminent bodily or cellular death, they would not qualify as
brain dead under an approach that focused on the unique aspects of anencepha-
ly, namely lack of potentiality for consciousness and imminent physical death
soon after birth, in classifying such individuals as in a state of death.'0 5 There-
fore, the limited approach cuts off the slippery slope before it can start sliding.
In addition to avoiding today's slippery slopes, a legal framework for anence-
phalic organ transplantation should also address the potential problems imposed
by tomorrow's scientific developments.
VI. THE FEAR THAT SCIENTISTS WOULD INTENTIONALLY CREATE
ANENCEPHALIC ORGAN DONORS
A. Scientists May Soon Possess the Ability to Intentionally Create Anence-
phalic Infants
Any regime set up to allow organ donation from anencephalic infants
must address not only the bioethical concerns obvious today, but also those
concerns that will likely be raised by technological developments in the future.
While it might sound like science fiction, the basic technology to intentionally
create anencephalic organ donors has already been developed--the question is
whether scientists will attempt to perfect it for human application. Scientists
have identified the genes responsible for neural tube defects, including exence-
phaly, a condition in mice roughly equivalent to human anencephaly.'1 6 Taking
these findings a step further, researchers at the University of Texas successfully
created headless mice, whose bodies were otherwise correctly formed, by eli-
not the same as being already dead." Paul A. Byme et al., Anencephaly-Organ
Transplantation?, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 23, 33 (1993). The case of the anencephalic infant,
however, does not fit so neatly into current concepts of death, a fact which would be of little
importance, but for the issue of transplantation.
104. Justice, supra note 46, at 1264.
105. R.D. Truog & J.C. Fletcher, Anencephalic Newborns: Can Organs Be Transplanted
Before Brain Death?, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 388, 388-91(1989).
106. See generally Diana M. Jurloff& Murlel J. Harris, Mouse Models for Neural Tube
Closure Defects, 9.6 HUMAN MOLECULAR GENETICS 993 (2000) (relaying findings indicating
responsibility of particular genes for neural tube defects in mice and indicating that genes
identified in mice with neural tube defects have potential homologues in humans).
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minating a particular gene, known as LimI, from the embryonic stem cells of
the mice.10 7 As the gene in question belongs to the homeobox group of genes,
which are "essential for embryonic development" and "present in all ani-
mals,"' 8 this discovery possesses a potentially vast, inter-species reach. 109 In
other words, just as the cloning of the sheep "Dolly" revealed to the public that
the trajectory of cloning technology was not far from intentionally cloning hu-
mans, such is the moment with developmental biology.
Not long after scientists demonstrated the ability to intentionally create
these headless animals, they began to theorize that, "[b]ecause the genetic me-
chanisms that control [animal] development are very similar to those that lay
down the human body plan it will be possible "to suppress the development of
the [human] embryo."' 10 Some have long hoped for similar possibilities, that
after suppression or modification of the proper genes, a human fetus "could
then be grown as a brain-dead body for spare parts.""' Due to its lack of a ca-
pacity for consciousness, the brain-dead human fetus would potentially be una-
ble to suffer harm. 112 These creatures would in essence be "cannibalized for
spare parts.'
113
Some celebrate the development of headless animals, for if such tech-
niques were perfected to create headless humans, many of the factors that inhe-
rently limit the efficacy of anencephalic organ donation would disappear in the
face of a potentially abundant supply of intentionally created anencephalic or-
gan donors.114 Indeed, one of the requirements for creating a successful trans-
plant program is repetition, which requires a sufficient volume of cases. This is
why larger transplant centers, such as the Mayo Clinic, have better transplant
success rates than smaller, regional programs."l 5 A larger supply of anence-
107. See W.W. Shawlot & R.R. Behringer, Requirement for Liml in Head-Organizer
Function, 374 NATURE 425 (1995) (finding the gene LimI to be the essential regulator of the
organization of the vertebrate head).
108. Lori Olwenstein, Headless: Lacking a Single Gene, Mice Are Born Without Heads,
DISCOVER, Jan. 1, 1996, available at http://discovermagazine.com/1996/jan/headless658.
109. See Jonathan Slack, Headless Tadpoles & an Informed Public, 390 NATURE 111
(1997) (describing the British researcher who corrects misunderstandings of his own work
which involves creation of headless tadpoles through the manipulation of genes).
110. Roger Highfield, Patient's Clones 'May Grow Transplant Organs,' THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Oct. 20, 1997, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html
=/archive/1 997/10/20/nclo2O.html.
111. Carol Kahn, Can We Achieve Immortality? The Ethics of Cloning and Other Life
Extension Technologies, FREE INQUIRY, Spring 1989, at 14-18.
112. David W. Brock, Cloning Human Beings: An Assessment of the Ethical Issues Pro
and Con, in NAT'L BIOETHICs ADVISORY COMM'N, 2 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS E4, E8 (1997).
113. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Cloning: Where Do We Draw the Line?, TIME, Nov. 8, 1993, at
65.
114. See D. Alan Shewmon et al., The Use ofAnencephalic Infants as Organ Sources, 261
J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 1773, 1774-75 (1989) (estimating that donation from naturally occurring
anencephalic infants would produce only eleven usable organs per year in the United States due
to the premature nature of most anencephalic births, low success rate of neonatal transplants,
and logistical difficulties in the transplant network).
115. See TRANSPLANT PROGRAMS AT MAYO CLINIC, available at http://www.mayoclinic
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phalic donor organs should logically lead to better success from this particular
source. 116 Additionally, some thinkers state that many of the donation consent
problems inherent in today's transplant donor sources, such as truly "informed
consent" and familial coercion, could be avoided in situations involving inten-
tionally created anencephalic organ donors.1 7 The presumption being, a head-
less organ donor would not have an interest in life necessitating consent to
organ donation. Further, the donor's parents would have presumably consented
to its creation for transplant purposes. 118 The argument is that once one accepts
the ethical reasoning in support of allowing organ donation from anencephalic
infants, it is a small leap along the same logical path to accept the ethical pro-
priety of allowing organ procurement from donor children intentionally created
to be anencephalic.11 9
Neoconservative pundit Charles Krauthammer dismays at the potential
creation of headless human beings to be used as organ donors, as such an initia-
tive would reduce "the human embryo to nothing more than a manufactured
thing .... ,120 Such an action would thereby violate the Kantian imperative to
treat each person as an end in themselves, not a means to someone else's end.
121
Those seeking to temper this response point out that mankind does not yet have
the ability to create headless human organ donors and that "[w]hether the tech-
nologies that have stirred public fears will ever become a reality is hard to
say."' 122 By pairing human cloning and artificial reproduction technology, how-
ever, it is not difficult to imagine a research protocol for perfecting this tech-
nology. Yet, many Americans who would not otherwise oppose scientific
research into stem cells, cloning, and gene manipulation technology, would
likely be put off by these endeavors, in addition to anencephalic organ dona-
tion, if the specter of intentionally creating anencephalic organ donors lurked in
the shadows.
Those taking this position agree with Krauthammer's statement, made in
.org/transplant. "Mayo Clinic doctors perform more than 1, 100 transplants a year, making it the
largest transplant program in the United States." Id.
116. See Richard J. Howard, The Challenging Triangle: Balancing Outcomes, Transplant
Numbers and Costs, 7 AM. J. TRANSPLANTION 2443 (2007) ("Transplant centers juggle at least
three objectives important to success: transplant volume, outcomes and costs.")
117. Laura J. Hilmert, Cloning Human Organs: Potential Sources and Property
Implications, 77 IND. L.J. 363, 369-70 (2002).
118. Id.
119. Shannon H. Smith, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Why a Ban on Human Cloning Is
Unacceptable, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 311,331 (1999) (noting that the utilitarian argument in favor
of anencephalic organ transplantation may be even stronger in cases involving intentionally
created anencephalic infants).
120. Charles Krauthammer, Cloning Debate Is Not Another Monkey Trial, WASH. POST,
May 10, 2002, available at http://www.townhall.com/columnists/CharlesKrauthammer/2002/
05/10/cloningdebate is not another-monkey trial.
121. Charles Krauthammer, OfHeadless Mice... and Men, TIME, Jan. 19, 1998, available
at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,987687,00.html.
122. Oliver Morton & Nigel Williams, First Dolly, Now Headless Tadpoles, 278 SCIENCE
798 (1997). See also Robert Pool, Saviors, DISCOVER, May 1, 1998, available at
http://discovermagazine.com/1998/may/saviors1442 (arguing that science will have less
difficulty growing individual organs than growing headless organ donors in laboratories).
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response to proposals for the allowance of embryonic cloning for research pur-
poses, but applicable in the present context, that "[t]his is not a slide down the
slippery slope... [t]his is downhill skiing."' 123
Since the intentional creation of anencephalic organ donors transgresses
the Kantian injunction internalized by many Americans, it is difficult to im-
agine such actions receiving legal protections at either the state or federal level
any time soon. Therefore, the fear of anencephalic infants being intentionally
created to serve as organ sources stands as a potential roadblock to the effective
use of naturally born anencephalic infants as organ donors, in addition to other
potentially beneficial channels of scientific inquiry. Any legal framework de-
signed to reap the benefits of anencephalic organ donation must therefore be
carefully tailored so as to ensure that anencephalic organ donation rests on solid
ground, safe from the slippery slope of anencephalic infants "on demand" for
transplant purposes. A legal regime allowing for anencephalic organ donation
should include provisions attacking the producers of intentionally created anen-
cephalic organ donors and those doctors unscrupulous enough to use organs
from intentionally created anencephalic humans in transplant procedures.
B. Proposed Legal Rules to Ensure the Integrity of the Anencephalic Organ
Transplant Process
1. Criminalization of Intentional Creation ofAnencephalic Human Beings
In order to ensure that scientists do not use emerging gene suppression
technology to create an endless supply of artificially created anencephalic organ
donors, lawmakers must impose criminal sanctions on anyone engaged in the
intentional creation of anencephalic infants. Such a measure would effectively
eliminate, or at least reduce, the stream of artificially created anencephalic do-
nor organs at its source. Current law and medical association guidelines do not
directly address the intentional creation of anencephalic infants, although they
have addressed similar bioethical issues, such as human cloning.
As scholars have analogized the use of anencephalic organ donors to the
possibility of using body clones for transplant purposes, 124 statutory or organi-
zational bans on human cloning might influence the structure and rationale of a
ban on the intentional creation of anencephalic organ donors. The medical
community, acting through medical associations, has refused to go beyond ex-
pressing opposition to reproductive cloning and advising medical professionals
to obey the laws of the nations in which they practice governing therapeutic
123. Charles Krauthammer, Cloning Debate Is Not Another Monkey Trial, WASH. POST,
May 10, 2002, available at http://www.townhall.com/colunists/CharlesKrauthammer/2002/
05/10/cloningdebate is not another monkeytrial..
124. See Shannon H. Smith, Note, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Why a Ban on Human Cloning
Is Unacceptable, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 311, 329 (1999) (noting that, like anencephalic infants,
body clones might lack the ability to be harmed due to the lack of capacity for consciousness).
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cloning. 125 Some argue that forms of therapeutic cloning are morally indistin-
guishable from the deliberate creation of an anencephalic human being.,126 It
seems unlikely that medical associations will lead the charge to condemn or
punish the intentional creation of anencephalic infants for use as transplant do-
nors. Legislatures must take charge in prohibiting the intentional creation of
anencephalic organ donors, much as they have taken a leading role in condemn-
ing, regulating, and often criminalizing various forms of human cloning. 27
Internationally, the issue of cloning creates huge controversy and concern,
as indicated by the strange alliances and position shifts that occurred during the
debate over the issue in the United Nations ("UN"). 128 The UN eventually set-
tled on a non-binding call for a qualified ban on human cloning.129 It seems
unlikely, however, that the UN Declaration on Human Cloning has put the is-
sue to rest given the stark differences in opinion expressed by different mem-
ber-nations during the UN debate.130 While the legislative bodies in the United
States have not addressed the intentional creation of anencephalic infants, they
have taken positions on human cloning technology.
Several state legislatures have banned human cloning, often imposing
criminal sanctions on those engaged in the practice. 131 Such regulations dem-
onstrate the willingness of American legislatures to address bioethical issues,1
3 2
125. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, POLICY E2.147: CLONING TO PRODUCE
CHILDREN (2003), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pfnew/pf onlinef n=result
Link&doc=policyfiles/HnE/E-2.147.HTM&s t=cloning&catg=AMA/HnE&catg-AMA/Bn
GnC&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth=l&&st~p=0&nth=3& (urging medical professionals not to
pursue "cloning-to-produce-children at this time," which presumably would include artificially
created anencephalic children); WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, THE WORLD MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION STATEMENT ON GENETICS AND MEDICINE (2005), available at http://www.wma.
net/e/policy/g I .htm (opposing reproductive cloning, noting reproductive cloning is considered
in many countries "to pose more of an ethical problem than therapeutic cloning" and urging
medical professionals to obey codes of medical ethics in their countries regarding cloning).
126. Ronald M. Green, Can We Develop Ethically Universal Stem Cell Lines, 8 NATURE
REVIEWS GENETICS 480, 481 (2007).
127. See infra notes 126-128 and accompanying text.
128. See generally Nigel M. de S. Cameron & Anna V. Henderson, Brave New World at
the General Assembly: The United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 145 (2008) (discussing debates between and position shifts of UN member- nations
regarding UN Declaration on Human Cloning).
129. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON HUMAN
CLONING (Mar. 23, 2005) (calling on UN member-states "to prohibit all forms of human cloning
in as much as they are incompatible with human dignity and the protection of human life").
130. See U.N. Press Release, General Assembly Adopts United Nations Declaration on
Human Cloning by Vote of 84-34-3 7 (Aug. 3, 2005), available at, http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2005/ga1 0333.doc.htm.
131. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1002 (2003); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
24185 (2003); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/40 (WEST 2008); IND. CODE § 35-46-5-2 (2006);
MICH. COMp. LAWS § 750.430a (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 1 1A- 1 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-39-02 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-16.4-2 (1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-14-27 (2004);
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.22 (2001).
132. But see CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE, LAW, AND
TECHNOLOGY, The Laws of Reproductive Technology, available at http://www.kentlaw.edu/
islat/reprotech.html (asserting that lawmakers have responded slowly to cloning and related
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a trend which logically should extend as science makes the deliberate creation
of anencephalic children clinically, if not politically, more feasible. Additional-
ly, these anti-cloning laws already cover the possibility of creating human
clones, including anencephalic clones, for the purpose of creating the perfectly
matched organ donor. 133 Nevertheless, these anti-cloning regulations do not
create national uniformity and do not cover the possibility that scientists might
intentionally create non-clone anencephalic infants to serve as transplant organ
reservoirs. Therefore, new legislation is required.
Legislatures should take action to prohibit the intentional creation of
anencephalic human beings. In particular, legislatures should not assume that
parents will universally reject creating anencephalic organ donors should such
technology become available. Past incidents in which parents have used scien-
tific developments in assisted reproduction to create organ donors for previous-
ly conceived siblings 134 vividly illustrates that any reliance on parents
abstaining from creating another life as a means to save an existing child is
sorely misplaced. Desperate situations lead people, including parents and doc-
tors, 135 to do desperate things. 136 Thus, given the current state, the law must
anticipate and address valid concerns regarding the deliberate creation of anen-
cephalic infants.
To enable anencephalic organ donation in general to become legally and
medically acceptable, legislative action is needed to properly circumscribe the
particular practice of intentionally creating anencephalic children. It would be
necessary to attack the sources of manufactured anencephalic donor organs in a
couple of ways. Specifically criminalizing the intentional creation of anence-
phalic human beings is an obvious first step. Congress must pass such a statute
in order to ensure uniformity in its application across the United States. 137 This
technologies).
133. See GEORGE W. MILLER, MORAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS 71 (1971) (explaining that risk of rejection declines when organs from an exact
genetic match are transplanted into recipient).
134. See Jacqueline Brooks, Sibling Selection, WEBMD, June 26, 2001, available at
http://www.webmd.com/news/20010626/sibling-selection (describing parents' decision to
undergo in- vitro fertilization to create a baby boy who donated umbilical cord blood to his
sister with a rare, incurable disease). See also Curran v. Bosze, 141 Ill.2d 473 (1990) (holding
that a father could not compel his minor twins to submit to bone marrow harvesting for the sake
of their half-brother, who was the father's son by a different woman).
135. See Rob Stein, New Practices In Organ Donation Inspire Debate, SAN FRANCIsCO
CHRONICLE, March 19, 2007, at A-5 (noting that doctors already bend existing rules by
beginning the organ harvesting process soon after a patient ceases to breath).
136. The case of the "Pillow Angel" caused quite a stir in both medical journals and the
tabloid press. This case involved Ashley, a severely mentally and physically disabled six-year-
old girl that intentionally had her growth halted by hormones, and had her uterus and breast
buds removed by doctors at the request of her parents. The parents stated on a blog, "Ashley's
smaller and lighter size makes it more possible to include her in the typical family life and
activities that provide her with needed comfort, closeness, security and love: meal time, car
trips, touch, snuggles, etc." See Nancy Gibbs, Pillow Angel Ethics, TIME, Jan. 22, 2007,
available at http://www.time.com/time/0,8816,1574851,00.html.
137. See Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1295, 1317 (1997)
(listing "'need for uniformity" among concerns that qualify as "national interests" often used to
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will also help avoid the creation of a medical tourism industry within America
in which states that choose not to impose criminal penalties on the intentional
creation of anencephalic organ donors would beckon transplant recipients from
other states.138 Such a law would take the decision about whether to intention-
ally create an anencephalic infant out of the hands of doctors and desperate par-
ents, as while "[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves.., it does
not follow that they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of
their children, ' 139 including those children who might one day be intentionally
programmed to develop as anencephalic through genetic manipulation. Impos-
ing criminal sanctions on those intentionally creating anencephalic children will
reduce the supply of such organs, but to ensure the integrity of a system legaliz-
ing anencephalic organ donation, legislatures must also address the possibility
that doctors turning a blind eye to the source of donor organs might use organs
from intentionally created anencephalic organ donors in transplants.
2. Imposition of Strict Liability for Anyone Transplanting Organs From In-
tentionally Created Anencephalic Infants
While criminalizing the intentional creation of anencephalic organ donors
will presumably deter some would-be producers of anencephalic transplant or-
gans, that measure alone will not effectively control the black market almost
certain to develop if the legalization of anencephalic organ donation coincides
with the development of the technology to intentionally create anencephalic
humans. 140 We have already seen sophisticated black markets for the selling of
kidneys from live donors arise, with some of the donors knowingly selling their
organs, and others being coerced into doing so. 14 A regime allowing for anen-
cephalic organ donation must provide strong ex ante disincentives for transplant
physicians and clinics to use organs harvested from clinically manufactured
anencephalic infants. Ergo, Congress must, in addition to criminalizing the
intentional creation of anencephalic humans, impose strict criminal liability on
any person transplanting organs from intentionally created anencephalic hu-
justify taking certain issues out of the hands of states).
138. Congress could presumably pass such a law under its Commerce Clause powers, as
evidenced by the Supreme Court's holding that prohibiting the intrastate possession or
manufacture of an article of commerce, including items for which the only commercial market is
illegal, is a rational means of regulating commerce in that product. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S
1 (2004). See also Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1941) (allowing Congress to ban, under
the Commerce Clause power, production of a small quantity of wheat for personal consumption
and use).
139. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 150 (Ky. 1969) (Steinfeld, J., dissenting).
140. See Michelle Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ
Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REv. 305 (2004) (detailing private organ sales and black
markets in organs driven by patients seeking alternatives to an overloaded altruistic organ
donation system).
141. See Anuj Chopra, Organ-Transplant Black Market Thrives in India, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Feb. 9, 2008 available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/
2008/02/09/MN23UPQOK.DTL.
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mans.
A strict liability crime "does not require a mens rea element", so that the
mere commission of the criminal act itself, regardless of the motive of the per-
son committing the act, results in criminal punishment. 142 The imposition of
strict liability on physicians and clinics that transplant organs from intentionally
created anencephalic humans ensures that unscrupulous or careless physicians
do not turn a blind eye to the source of their organs and keeps the difficult task
of proving a physician's knowledge or intent from undermining the integrity of
the anencephalic donor system. 143 Under such a statute, these medical profes-
sionals cannot avoid criminal penalties by claiming that they were unaware of
the source of the donor organs used in their transplants.
The proposed strict liability regime incentivizes medical professionals to
ask questions about the source of their organs. These professionals, due to the
threat of strict liability, will in effect support the law proposed above -crimina-
lizing the intentional creation of anencephalic humans - by refusing to partici-
pate in a market for donor organs from intentionally created anencephalic
infants and verifying the sources of donor organs offered for use in their prac-
tices in order to protect their own professional interests. In effect, criminalizing
the willful creation of anencephalic infants and imposing strict liability on phy-
sicians and clinics using transplant organs from this source will mutually rein-
force each other: physicians will respond to the threat of liability by
investigating organ sources, thus reducing economic incentives to create anen-
cephalic transplant donors.
The United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS") would likely play a
major role in this regime, administratively tracking whether banned organs are
being used. This organization already "monitors every organ match to ensure
adherence to UNOS policy, and works ... to develop equitable policies that
maximize the limited supply of organs."'144 Therefore, UNOS already possesses
the capabilities to track and audit organs obtained from anencephalic infants.
For instance, upon detecting a statistical spike in the number of anencephalic
organs used in transplant procedures conducted by a particular medical profes-
sional, a particular clinic, or in a particular region, UNOS could initiate an in-
vestigation. Having legally represented a transplant center that was officially
reviewed by UNOS for allegedly "upcoding" liver transplant patients, it is clear
that UNOS possesses significant power to investigate and regulate transplant
physicians and programs and can effectively shut down a transplant program by
restricting access to organs procured through its national network. 145 However,
142. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (listing definition under "crime").
143. See A.P. SIMESTER, APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 25-33 (A.P. Simester ed., Oxford
University Press) (2005) (listing cost-effectiveness, administrative convenience, and difficulties
of proof among rationales for imposing strict liability for criminal offenses).
144. United Network for Organ Sharing, What We Do, available at
http://www.unos.org/whatWeDo.
145. Author Fazal Khan legally represented a large urban transplant center that was under
UNOS investigation from 1995-1998. This investigation was taken very seriously by the
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being a non-profit, private organization, UNOS does not have the legal authori-
ty to impose criminal or civil sanctions. Yet, the information gathered by
UNOS can serve as a predicate to trigger state and federal criminal investiga-
tions. With the strict liability regime described in this subsection, transplant
doctors and programs would have a strong incentive to investigate their organ
providers, thus reinforcing the intended effect of criminal penalties for willfully
creating anencephalic humans.
Congress should strongly consider this proposed legislation because the
possible intentional creation of anencephalic organ donors, like human cloning,
is "a matter far too important to be left solely in the hands of the scientific and
medical communities. ' ' 146 This is because "any discovery that touches upon
human creation is not simply a matter of scientific inquiry [but] a matter of mo-
rality and spirituality as well., 147 For medical culture and general society to
accept a framework that allows anencephalic organ donation to occur, it is a
desideratum that lawmakers address legitimate moral concerns regarding the
intentional creation of anencephalic human beings for use as organ donors.
Legislatures can best accomplish this through the criminal law, as, in the view
of the majority of people, the intentional creation of anencephalic humans
would be a grave moral violation, and "[c]rimes are the sorts of serious wrongs
that merit state punishment of the wrongdoer." 148 By criminalizing the inten-
tional creation of anencephalic infants and imposing strict liability on physi-
cians and clinics using organs from intentionally created anencephalic infants in
transplant procedures, Congress would ensure that society could enjoy the ben-
efits of anencephalic organ donation without fear of the slippery slope. In par-
ticular, the allowance of the practice could lead to a brave new world in which
scientists literally farm humans deliberately rendered anencephalic to serve as
organ donors.
VII. A POSSIBLE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPLICATION OF ANENCEPHALIC ORGAN
DONATION
The allowance of organ harvesting from anencephalic infants, even if
properly limited under a tight legal framework, could lead to unforeseen conse-
quences. One area of particular concern arises out of the disparity in "the abili-
ty of members of different socioeconomic classes to benefit from such
technology.', 149 The possibility exists that, should anencephalic organ donation
transplant program as they knew UNOS had the power to severely limit their transplant
activities. The transplant program, however, was also aware that UNOS did not have the
authority to impose criminal or civil sanctions. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Justice, UIC Med.
Ctr. Pays $2 Million to U.S. and State of Ill. to Settle Liver Transplant Fraud Suit (Nov. 17,
2003) (available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2003/prl 11703_01.pdf).
146. James D. Watson, Moving Toward the Clonal Man, ATLANTIC, May 1971, at 50.
147. Bill Clinton, Remarks by President Clinton on Cloning (Mar. 4, 1997) (Transcript
available at 1997 WL 571115).
148. Grant Lamond, What Is a Crime?, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 631 (2007).
149. Sandra Anderson Garcia, Sociocultural and Legal Implications of Creating and
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be legally permitted, the practice could benefit children in society's higher so-
cioeconomic classes at the expense of those in lower socioeconomic classes.
Several factors render poor mothers more likely to give birth to children
with anencephaly than their more economically advantaged counterparts. 150 On
the most obvious level, want of basic nutrition increases the incidence rates of
birth defects of many varieties,15 a fact that bears more heavily on the poor
than the rich due to lack of resources. Similarly, while folic acid supplementa-
tion has proven to be a successful technique in the fight to prevent anencepha-
ly,152 "[w]omen who were non-white, were aged 18-24 years, had less than a
high school education, or had a household income of [less than] $25,000 were
the least likely to report daily consumption of a supplement containing folic
acid" in a recent study conducted by the Center for Disease Control.' 53 Finally,
environmental exposure to toxins, a plight which overwhelmingly affects the
poor, can drastically increase the likelihood of neural tube defects such as anen-
cephaly. 1
54
While poor women face an increased risk of anencephalic pregnancy,
women from higher socioeconomic classes enjoy the benefits of increased pre-
valence of prenatal screening and ease of access to abortion, which, in tandem,
render women from society's upper echelons much less likely than poor women
to actually bring to term a fetus suffering from a genetic defect as serious as
anencephaly.1 55 One possible effect of this dynamic could be that, should
anencephalic organ harvesting be permitted, the organs of anencephalic child-
ren of poor families willing to donate the organs of their children could be used
to improve the lives of children of rich parents with access to high quality med-
Sustaining Life Through Biomedical Technology, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 469,473 (1996).
150. See Birgitte M. Blatter et al., Review of Neural Tube Defects: Risk Factors in
Parental Occupation and the Environment, 102:2 ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. 140, 141 (1994)
(noting that across societies and racial groups, the prevalence of anencephaly increases as
socioeconomic status decreases). See also Yang et al., Socioeconomic Status in Relation to
Selected Birth Defects in a Large Multicentered US Case-Control Study, 167:2 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOL. 145, 150 (2008) (noting that an international trend also exists within the United
States).
151. See generally Susan L. Carmichael et al., Maternal Food Insecurity Is Associated with
IncreasedRisk of Certain Birth Defects, 137:9 J. OF NUTRITION 2087 (noting that lack of access
to food in sufficient quantities to meet basic needs increases occurrences of birth defects).
152. See De Wals et al., supra note 9.
153. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Use of Supplements Containing Folic
Acid Among Women of Childbearing Age-United States, 2007, 57.11 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 5, 6 (Jan. 11, 2008).
154. See, e.g., Stemp-Morlock, supra note 6, at A78 (linking pesticides to increased
incidences of anencephaly among parents who work in agricultural fields); Joshua M. Kagan,
Note, Workers 'Rights in the Mexican Maquiladora Sector: Collective Bargaining, Women's
Rights, and General Human Rights: Law, Norms, and Practice, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y
153, 163 (2005) (observing high rates of anencephaly among industrial workers in factories
along the border between the United States and Mexico, presumably due to exposure to the
toxin, PCB).
155. See Sonia Mateu Suter, The Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 AM. J. L. & MED.
233, 236 (2002) (noting that the rise in prenatal testing coincided with the recognition of a
woman's right to an abortion, increasing the ability of women with access to medical care to
control their reproductive lives).
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ical care capable of carrying out an infant transplant. This fear could cause
some who would otherwise be willing to embrace anencephalic organ donation
to instead shy away from the practice due to its possible class consequences.
While concern over the class implications of a policy permitting anence-
phalic organ donation is legitimate, it should not bar the actual implementation
of such a regime. To begin, until such a program is implemented, no one can
know how these class concerns will play out in reality. Additionally, the prob-
lem, should such concerns come to fruition, would arise not out of the policy
permitting anencephalic organ donation, but would rather stem from the dispar-
ities in resources between the rich and the poor. The best solutions to these
class concerns would attempt to provide poor mothers with greater access to
prenatal care 156 and nutrition, 157 rather than attempting to ban anencephalic or-
gan donation altogether.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Anencephaly results in swift death for those infants who suffer from it.
Even while their bodies live, these infants do not in any way experience the
world or even their own existence. Nevertheless, such children possess organs
which could be used for transplantation into other children in need of them,
ameliorating the effects of the fact that "the demand for organs is far outstrip-
ping the supply. ' 158 From a utilitarian perspective, allowing donation of organs
from anencephalic infants seems proper as it benefits the recipients of the or-
gans and the families of both the donor and recipient, while burdening the
anencephalic donor herself to little or no degree.
Deontological concerns prove more troubling than utilitarian considera-
tions when dealing with anencephalic infant organ transplantation. While it
would seem that such infants, when used as donors, are being treated as a
means to an end, some unpersuasively counter with the utilitarian argument that
allowing organ donations from anencephalic infants respects them "as human
beings because they serve a highly worthwhile purpose.', 159 A more persuasive
response to these Kantian concerns is, however, that anencephalic infants are
born immediately into the state of death, due to their imminent physical death
and their complete lack of consciousness or the potentiality for consciousness.
156. See Carolyn Jacobs Chachkin, What Potent Blood. Non-Invasive Prenatal Genetic
Diagnosis and the Transformation of Modern Prenatal Care, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 9,38 (2007)
(arguing that both public and private insurers should cover non-invasive prenatal testing,
emerging technology capable of identifying fetal birth defects including anencephaly).
157. See G. Maberly et al., Trends in Wheat Flour-Fortification with Folic Acid and lron-
Worldwide, 2004 and 2007, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwR/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5701 a4.htm
(last visited April 4, 2008) (noting that as of 2007, fifty four countries fortify their wheat flour
with folic acid).
158. Fred H. Cate, Human Organ Transplantation: The Role of Law, 20 J. CORP. L. 69, 70
(1995).
159. Willke & Andrusko, supra note 44, at 31.
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Such a view avoids the unfavorable consequences of abandoning the dead do-
nor rule altogether and eliminates the slippery slope risks inherent in declaring
anencephalic infants to be non-people completely devoid of life due to their
permanent lack of consciousness. This approach would legally define anence-
phalic infants as being born into death. This category, strictly limited to anen-
cephalic infants, would be added to the definitions of death adopted by the
Uniform Determination of Death Act, thereby making possible transplantation
of the organs of anencephalic infants into newborns needing transplants without
violation of the dead donor rule.
Unanswered questions remain as to some of the practical effects of a poli-
cy-allowing anencephalic infants to serve as organ donors. One of these con-
cerns, the fear that scientists will intentionally create anencephalic organ
donors, can be addressed legally, such as by the proposed laws criminalizing
the intentional creation of anencephalic humans and imposing strict liability on
transplant doctors using organs donated from intentionally created anencephalic
infants. Other issues cannot be addressed so simply. For instance, legitimate
concerns exist that the allowance of anencephalic organ donation could benefit
the children of the rich, who are more likely to have access to exceptional med-
ical care, at the expense of the poor, who remain more likely to give birth to an
anencephalic child who might be used as a source of transplant organs. 160 In
addition, it remains questionable how great an impact the allowance of anence-
phalic organ transplantation will have on the dire predicaments of children in
need of organs. 161 These questions appear unanswerable in the absence of ac-
tual acceptance of a policy allowing the harvesting of anencephalic infants' or-
gans for transplantation. These unanswered questions should not delay the
implementation of such a policy, as the use of anencephalic organs in trans-
plants is both morally justified and legally advisable. Until those in positions of
power deem such a policy permissible, infants born with defects that could be
cured through a transplant will continue to die needlessly and the parents of
anencephalic infants will continue to be denied a chance to transform their per-
sonal tragedy into an altruistic good.
160. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
161. The number of anencephalic infants actually carried to term is limited, and the
availability of abortion and genetic counseling will likely further decrease that number. See
Alexander Morgan Capron, Anencephalic Donors: Separate the Dead from the Dying,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1987, at 5 (observing that only 2,000 to 3,000 of such babies are
born every year, not all of whom will be offered as organ donors by their parents); Frank A.
Chervenak, et al., When is Termination of Pregnancy During the Third Trimester Morally
Justifiable?, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 502 (1984) (noting that in cases of anencephaly, even
third trimester abortion is largely considered ethically justifiable). See also DOROTHY C. WERTZ
& JOHN C. FLETCHER, GENETICS AND ETHICS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 373 (2004) (49% of United
States genetic professionals would counsel for anencephaly in negative fashion, thereby making
abortion of such infants more likely).
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